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A general minimax theorem for infinite games due to H. F. Bohncnblust, 
S. Karlin, and L. S. Shapley is related to the theory of best approximation and 
enables us to prove readily a general result including as special cases theorems in 
the literature proved with greater effort. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article is to point out a strong interrelation between 
two areas enjoying much contemporary activity: approximation theory and 
game theory. Specifically, a general result on best approximation on a 
compact set is stated and proved below, its proof relying on a general 
minimax theorem for infinite games ([ 1; 2, pp. 90-9 1 I), as well as on some 
properties of the solutions of such games. This result (Theorems 3 and 4) 
includes as special cases, theorems in the literature on best approximation 
with restricted ranges ([3, theorem l]), best approximation with interpolation 
conditions ([4], the characterization theorem) and related results. 
2 
We start by recalling some definitions and results from game theory that 
will be used in the sequel. A game is an (ordered) triplet {S, , S,, G}; the 
sets S, and S, are topological spaces and G is a continuous real valued 
function on S, X S,. Player A chooses x E S,, B chooses y E S, and 
G(x, y) is the pay-off to A (-G(x, y) is the pay-off to I?). Each player tries to 
maximize his pay-off without knowing the choice of his opponent. Suppose 
x*ES,,y*ES,andforeveryxES,,yES,,we’have 
G&Y*) 4 W*,Y*) 4 W*,Y). Cl) 
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Then, x* (JJ*) is called an optimal strategy for A(B), and the ordered pair 
{x*, y*} is called a solution of the game. It is clear that if (2, y”} is also a 
solution, then so are (x*, y’} and {+,y*}. The number u = G(x*,y*) is called 
the value of the game and is independent of the particular solution {x*, y*}. 
The elements of S,(S,) are called the (pure) strategies of A (B). In general, a 
game does not have a solution in the above sense; but it does have one if the 
game is extended as follows (see [2, p. 241): Let s”,(S,) be the set of the 
regular probability measures on the a-algebra generated by the open subsets 
of S,(S,). This is an extension of the set S, if we identify x E S, with the 
atomic measure p,, i.e., with the measure satisfying 
where U is a measurable set in S,. Similarly y E S, is identified with the 
atomic measure vY. 
The function G is extended to .!?A X SB by 
Go19 v>= js I, G(x, Y) Q(x) MY). A B 
Non-atomic measures ,D and v are called mixed strategies for player A and 
B, respectively, while p, and v, are called pure strategies. In case of a pure 
strategy, we shall use the notations G(x, v), G(u, y) and G(x, y) rather than 
GCu,, v>, W, v,J and W,, v,J. 
A solution of the game is an ordered pair {,u*, v*} such that 
G@, v*) < G@*, v*> < G@“, v) (2) 
for all ,D E SA and v E s’,. Clearly, if {iu; v’} is also a solution, then so are 
(,u*, v’} and (~7, v*}. 
We now define the problem of best approximation and the equivalent 
game. Let Z be a compact topological space, C(Z) the normed linear space of 
all real continuous functions with domain Z, z,-, (n > 1) an n-dimensional 
subspace of C(Z) and let K be a convex and compact subset of n, _ r. Let W 
be a nonnegative real valued function defined on Z X [0, co), continuous in 
both variables, and increasing and convex in the second. 
Given fE C(Z), the approximation problem is to find p* E K such that 
for all p E K. 
max{W(t, If(t) -P*WO; t E 4 
< max 1 W, If(t) -pW t E 4 
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Define now the function G, by G&p) = W(t, If(t) -t)(t)l) for all c E Z 
and p E R, _ 1. Notice that the monotonicity and convexity of W imply the 
convexity of G, (in p). 
Let A and B be two players, and consider the game 
I-= {Z,K, G,). (3) 
The following theorem shows that although the strategy spaces of players 
A and B consist of probability measures, both players have “simple” optimal 
strategies. 
THEOREM 1 ([2, pp. 9&91,95-981). The game T= {Z,K, G,} has a 
solution {A*, v,,,), where I* = Cyzo Appu,,, 17 > 0, i = 0, l,.,., n; Cyz 0 &+ = 1, 
vp* is a pure strategy and p* E K. 
We shall denote this solution by {A*, p*} rather than by (A*, vPS). 
THEOREMS ([2,Lemma2.2.1]). Let {A*,p*) be a solution off (as in 
Theorem 1) and let u(f) be its value. Zf LF > 0 for some i, then 
G+lti,P*) = v(f)* 
COROLLARY 1. Let 1* be an optimaI strategy for playerA (as in 
Theorem 1) and let p, and p2 be pure optimal strategies for player B. Then 
p,(tJ =pz(ti)for every i such that AT > 0. 
ProojI If p,(t,) +p&,) for some i with LF > 0, then -the monotonicity of 
W in its second argument implies that f(tJ -pl(tl) =p2(ti) --f(t,) # 0. Set 
P3 = (PI +P*)/2; f or everyj with AF > 0, lf(tj) -p,(tj)l< If(tj) -pl(tj)l and 
If(ti) -p3(tr)l < If(ti) -p,(ti)l; hence G,@*, p3) < vdf), contradicting the 
optimality of 1*. 
DEFINITION. An n-dimensional subspace, A,, of C(2) is said to be an 
interpolation space if, when given n distinct points of Z, t,, ttr..., t, and real 
values yl, y2,..., y,, there exists a p E A, such that p(t,) = yi for i = 1,2 ,..., n. 
With this definition we have, 
LEMMAS. Let n,-, be an interpolation space and Zet (A*,p*} be a 
solution, given by Theorem 1, of the game r= (I, U’, G,j, where 
U,={p:pE1r,_,,I(p(I~22((f((~.Zfv(S)>O,thenI:>Oforeoeryi. 
Remark 1. Using the monotonicity of W and Theorem 2, one can show 
that (A*,p* \ solves a game {Z, U, G,) with IL,- 1 3 U 3 U, iff it solves r. 
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Proof of Lemma 1. Assume to the contrary of the claim of the lemma, 
that 2 7, = 0 for some i,, so that the set T = {t, : Li > 0) contains at most n 
points. There exists an element pT E II,- i satisfying pT(t) =f(t) for every 
t E T, and hence G,@*,p,) = 0 < u(J), contradicting the optimality of p* 
and 1*. 
Notice that pr need not be an element of U,, since by Remark 1, U, can be 
replaced by any compact and convex set containing both U, and pT. 
Notice also that if fe K (rr-1 is not necessarily an interpolation space), 
then v(f) > 0 since B cannot choose p E K which guarantees a zero pay-off 
to A, and hence, if K,, _ , is an interpolation space (and since W is increasing 
in its second argument), then 27 > 0 for all i. 
In the following we assume that f&K. Also, we put an additional 
requirement on W, namely, W(t, 0) = 0 for every t E I. 
COROLLARY 2. Let z,,-, be an interpolation space, and let 1* be an 
optimal strategy for player A in the game (I, U,, G,]. Then p* is an optimal 
strategy for player B iff 
f Cti> -P*Cti) = Celli (f (IO) -P*(tO)), 
Moreover, B has a unique optimal strategy. 
i = 1, 2 ,..., n. 
The proof follows similar lines to those of the proof of Lemma 1. 
Another proof of the unicity of p* follows from Corollary 2.1 of [I] and 
Lemma 1. 
Notice that if A* is an optimal strategy for A, then it follows from (2) that 
it is an optimal strategy in the restricted game {I,,, K, G,IZ,,}, where I,, is a 
Bore1 subset of Z, containing the support of 1* and G,]Z, is the restriction of 
G, to I,. 
Let now K be the compact, convex subset of n,-, defined by 
K = fiseJ H,, where Z is a compact topological index space and each H, is 
defined by 
H,= {P:PE~,-,,L,p>c(s)}. 
We assume 
(i) L, is a continuous linear functional on 7r-,, for every s; 
(ii) for every p E n,- 1, L, p is a continuous funcion of s, and 
(iii) c is a continuous function on J. 
By Theorem 1, A has an optimal strategy L* with supp(J*) containing at 
most n + 1 points and B has a pure optimal strategy belonging to K. 
We now define a new game in which B will not be restricted to choose his 
polynomial from K. However, p* will be an optimal strategy in the new 
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game iff it is an optimal strategy in the original one. Moreover, the two 
games will have the same value. Define 
c,O, P) = G,+, P), t E I, 
=[l-(L,P-c(o)lv, t E J, 
where u is the value of the game IY Also, define r’= (I U J, U,, G,}. Notice 
that by Remark 1, K = 17, imposes no restriction on player B. By Theorem 1, 
f has a solution {I,@}, where I= C;‘=O x,,u,,, each 1, ) 0 and C& 1, = 1. 
We now show that the two games, r and F, have the same value and the 
same optimal strategies for player B. 
LEMMA 2. Let v and v’ be, respectively, the values of r and i? Then 
IT< v. 
Proof: Let p* be an optimal strategy for B in lY By choosing p*, B 
protects himself from paying more than v; hence V’Q v. 
LEMMA 3. If {x,fl} is a solution of F, then BE K. 
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that there exists t E J for which 
L, p’ < c(t). Then c,(t,pT > v > 6, contradicting the optimality of @. 
LEMMA 4. The values of r and i= are equal. 
Proof: By Lemma 2, v’< v. According to Lemma 3, B will choose an 
element of K, which guarantees A a pay-off of at least v; hence t7 = v. 
COROLLARY 3. p* is an optimal strategy for B in the game r iff it is an 
optimal strategy in F. 
3. CHARACTERIZATION THEOREMS 
In this section we prove Kolmogorov-type theorems. 
THEOREM 3. Let I= C;“=l &fit,, with 1, > 0 for i = 1,2 ,..., m, 
t,, &,..., t, E 1 and tk+l, fk+2,..., t, E J for some 0 Q k 6 m (any one of the 
two sets of 1,‘s may be empty), be an optimal strategy for A. Then p” E 7~,-, is 
an optimal strategy for B 8 there does not exist p E II,,- 1 satisfying 
(9 NdW4) -d(4)) 2 0, i = 1, 2 ,..., k, 
(4 Lt, p 2 0, i = k + 1, k + 2 ,..., m, and 
(iii) for at least one i, i = 1, 2,..., m, a sfrict inequality (in either (i) or 
(ii)) holds. 
238 LAPIDOT AND SHISHA 
ProoJ: Assume first that there exists p E II,-, satisfying (i)-(iii). For a 
small positive s, ZT =fl+ ep satisfies 
I fCti> -PCtiI G I f(li) 7 FCti)l 9 ti E Z (4) 
and hence 
GAfi 7 PI> 6 GAti 3 d), ti E I. (5) 
Similarly, for ti E J, 
l - CLli F - C(ti)) > 1 - (Lfi p - C(ti)). (6) 
We can write (5) and (6) in the from 
From (iii) we conclude, 
namely, 
Conversely, assume that p is better than p’ against 1, then (5) implies (4) 
which implies 
IfCti) -FttiI 2 IfCti) -FttiI = Iftti) -dCti> - (Ptti) -Ftti))l 9 
i.e., (p(ti) -p”(ti))(f(ti) -j(tJ) > 0 for ti E I. 
Similarly, 
’ - (LtjP-c(ti)) < l - (Ltifi- C(ti)), ti E J, 
so that L,,(p -3) > 0, ti E J, and since (7) holds, strict inequality holds for 
at least one i. 
THEOREM 4. Let R,(3) be the set of points t E Zfor which G,(t,p”) attains 
its maximum and let R,(pT be the set of points t E J for which L, @ = c(t). 
Then p’ is an optimal strategy for B lr there does not exist p E 7c,-, 
satisfying 
6) pMf(t) -P(t)> > 0, t E R,(d), and 
(ii) L,p > 0, t E RAz-9~ 
BEST APPROXIMATION 239 
Proof. We have to prove the “only if’ part only. Assume that p’ is not an 
optimal strategy for B and let p’ be an optimal one. There exists an optimal 
strategy x, for A, such that G,(l,pI ( u, where u is the value of the game. Set 
R = R,(pT u R,(p?)u supp(;i). Then (x,@) is a solution of the game f 
restricted to R and hence u = G,(f,@) < G,(f,p? for some f E supp(x). By the 
definitions of 1, RI($) and R,(j)‘), we have that G,(t, @) Q e,(f,p) < c,(f, j) < 
G,(t, p? for every t E R,(p3 U R,(p?; hence j ‘p’ satisfies (i) and (ii). 
4. APPLICATIONS 
In this section we show that the game (3) generalizes some best approx- 
imation problems. 
(a) Approximation with Restricted Ranges 
Let fE C(Z) and let 7f, _ 1 be an interpolation subspace of C(Z). Let I, and 
I0 be compact subsets of Z containing, each, at least n points and let 1 and ZJ 
be continuous functions on I, and I’, respectively, with Z(t) <f(t) on I, and 
u(t)>,f(t)onP. DelineK={p:pEa,-,,p>ZonZ,andp<uonZ’} and 
consider the game Z = {Z, K, G,}. Let L, and L ‘, t E Z, be the point 
evaluation functionals, i.e., L, g = L’g = g(t) for every g E C(Z). Then 
K= {p:pE X,-l, L,p> l(t) for tE I, and L’p Q u(t) for t E I”}. The 
solution of the game Z = (I, K, G,} is best approximating f from n,- 1 with 
restricted ranges [ 31. 
(b) Approximation with Znterpolatory Constraints 
Let fE C(Z), let IL,,- I be an interpolation subspace of C(Z) and let 
t t 1, z ,..., t, (l<m<n) be m distinct points in I. Set K={p:pEn “-,, 
p(t,) =f(ti), i = 1, 2 ,..., m} and consider the problem: find p* E K such that 
max(G,(t,p*); tEZ}<max{G,(t,p); tEZ} for allpER. 
The set K is, in general, not compact (unless m = n, in which case the 
problem is trivial). Let poEK, define K,={p:pEK, Ilpll<\lf-pollt 
]] f I]} and consider the game Z= {I, K,, G,}. Let u be the value of this game. 
We extend the set {t, , t, ,..., m t } by adding n - m distinct, and different 
from the original m points -t,+ i , tm+*,..., t, and set 
K,= {p:pEn,-, 
Li P = Ptti) >ftti)9 i = 1, 2 ,..., m, 
L”+ip = -p(ti) >, -f(ti), i = 1, 2 ,..., m, 
Li P = P(ti> >f(ti) - 2vv i = m + 1, m t 2 ,..., n, 
L” + ip = -p(t,) z -f(ti) - 2U, i=m+ l,mt2 ,..., n). 
240 LAPIDOT AND SHISHA 
It is readily seen that player A has an optimal strategy 1 with 
]suppX(=n+l and since n,-, is an interpolation space, B has a unique 
optimal strategy. The value and the optimal strategy for player B in Z and in 
z-0 = {ZU { 1, 2,..., 2n}, K,, Gf} are the same. (Gf is defined as in Section 2, 
where c(i) =f(t,), i = 1, 2 ,..., m, c(n + i) = -f(ti), i = 1, 2 ,..., m, c(i) = 
f (ti) - 2v9 i = m + 1, m + 2 ,..., n, and c(n+i)=-f(t,)-2v, i=m+ 1, 
m + 2,..., n.) This approximation problem had been first considered (and 
solved) in [4]. The characterization theorem of [4] follows from our 
Theorem 3 and the fact that 71, _ i is an interpolation space. 
(c)Approximation in an Asymmetric Norm 
We conclude by defining a game whose solutions are the best approx- 
imations in an asymmetric norm. This problem is considered in [5]. This 
asymmetric norm is defined by 
N(f) = min{A; -&~,(t) <f(t) <A&t) for all t E I), 
where vi and o2 are given continuous functions on Z with 0 < vi(t) < p*(t) 
for all t E I. For the game Z= {Z, U,, G,}, where G,(t,p) = min{l; -,@,(I) < 
f(t) < Q,(t)) and U, = { p : p E rr-, , N(p) < 2N(f)}, an optimal strategy 
for B is a best approximation to f from II,,- i in this asymmetric norm and 
the extended equioscillation theorem proved in [5] follows. 
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